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FRENCH SPOLIATIONS AWARDS.
What is the true theory of distribution of the money awarded
by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1899, in satisfaction of the
French spoliations claims? To answer-this question one must
first give the story (in part) of the very conflicting decisions of
the courts (as to the distribution under the similar Act of
March 3, x891) before the right theory was finally reached-if,
indeed, it may be said to have been finally reached yet, so as
to be binding in other States than Pennsylvania and Massa-
chusetts.
We should begin with bearing in mind two facts; first that
these spoliations were so long ago (say ninety years before the
Act of March 3, 189i, was passed) that in every instance all the
children of the original sufferer were dead, and there were no
descendants nearer than grandchildren, sometimes, perhaps,
none nearer than great-grandchildren; second, that while some
of the sufferers from spoliations died intestate, others of them
left wills. "Sufferer from spoliations" is a rather cumbrous
phrase. "Claimant," which would have described him when
he was living, is not the correct word for him now, but does
describe correctly his administrator de bon si non (or de bonis non
cum testamento annexo, as the case may be), appointed for the very
purpose of collecting the claims. "Ancestor" will do very-well
in some cases, and in others we may use the more generic term,
the law Latin prpositus.
A little reflection will show us that there are several differ-
ent theories from which to select as to distributing the awards,
and the best way to bring out the differences in these theories
will be to take the instance of ancestor William Gray in the
much litigated Massachusetts case of Codman v. Brooks- In
tkis case the spoliations award was $26oooo, and the legal con-
test was, of course, a lively one.
William Gray, who died in 1825, left a will giving the resi-
due of his estate to some-not all-of his children, and the four
theories were as follows:
A. Distribution should follow the will.
B. Division should be first into fourths, because the ances-
tor left four children (all dead long before March, x89x) whose
descendants were living, and then subdivisions -should follow
under such first division.
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C.* Division should be first into twenty-thirds, because
twenty-three grandchildren were (in March, x891) either living
or (having died) had left descendants living; and then sub-
divisions, great-grandchildren taking by substitution, per
stir pes.
[It seems almost unnecessary to add, by way of obvious cor-
ollary, that if the earliest generation of which one or more
members 'is, or are, now living is not grandchildren, but great-
grandchildren, then theory C would require that the division
should be according to the number of great-grandchildren,
with representation per stirpes.]
D. Division should be into nineteenths, because nineteen
grandchildren were living (March, 189 i ) and children of de-
ceased grandchildren should be excluded.
Affirming the decision of the court below, the Supreme
Court of the State, by a majority of five to two, decided, accord-
ing to theory A, that the will must govern, while Field, C. J.,
and Allen, J., dissented in favor of theory B: Codman v.
Brooks, i59 Mass. 477 (1893).
The case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States, with two other cases, one from Massachusetts and the
other from Connecticut-both had adopted theory A-all were
argued and decided together in 1896, the decision being en-
titled Blagge v. Balch, 62 U. S. 439. Justice Gray took no part
in the decision, being related to the parties in interest in Cod-
man v. Brooks. It is a curious fact that down to that time not
one of the counsel in that case was contending for the theory
which I have called C; they (one or another of them) were ad-
vocating all three of the other theories.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut courts and remanded the cases. But
that was not the end of Codman v. Brooks. The opinion of
the Supreme Court -(Fuller C. J.) was by no means clear.
Theory A was rejected, but beyond that it would seem that
nothing was decided. When the case came on again in the
Suffolk County (Boston) Court, before Justice Allen, he decided
according to theory B. On appeal, heard in the Supreme Court
of the State by five of the judges, the case (167 Mass. 499) was,
in 1897, finally decided according to theory C (the opinion by
Knowlton, J.), "The money . . . will be divided into twenty-
three equal shares, of which one will be given to each of the
surviving grandchildren, and one to the children of each of the
deceased grandchildren." Allen J., dissented, still maintain-
ing that theory B was the one that the Supreme Court of the
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United States had meant them to adopt. "This," he says,
"seems to me to be the meaning of the language used."
What was the fate ultimately of the Coxinecticut case, after
it was thus remanded, does not appear in the reports of that
State.
In Pennsylvania the litigation over this question had also a
checkered career. In the Clement estate case (Orphans' Court
of Philadelphia, November, i89i), Judge Ashman decided
according to theory C, Hanna, Presid't J., affirming (Novem-
ber 14) in an opinion to be found in 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 474.
Two weeks later (Nov. 28), Stokes' estate case, 48 Phila. Leg.
Int. 498, was decided in the same court according to the same
theory by Judge Hanna, in a brief but comprehensive and very
clear opinion. From this decision no appeal was taken. The
Clement's estate case was appealed and the decision of the
Orphans' Court was in July, x892, reversed by the Supreme
Court of the State, but on a second appeal in z894, that court
overruled their earlier decision, saying very frankly that
further consideration had convinced them that their first
views were not sustainable. In brief this court now and finally
adopted theory C as the true one: Clement's Estate, i5o Pa. 85,
and x6o Pa. 39r.
Discussion is omitted of decisions on spoliations claims in
the Court of Claims. Some of these are instructive from the
point of view of rejection of theory A, but they do not help us to
decide among the other theories. In the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, there was one case which will be men-
tioned briefly later.
The decisions in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts in favor
of theory C, will, of course, carry much weight in other States,
but, perhaps, their highest courts may feel at liberty to reach
some other conclusion.
I ask to be allowed to discusss the question from the point
of view of a Maryland lawyer, but before considering the Mary-
land decisions on spoliations awards, we must consider the
state of facts (which frequently arises) when there are no living
descendants of the propositus, and the nearest relations are col-
laterals. To this state of thing we must apply theories, which
we may call "Collateral B," "Collateral C." "Collateral B"
would begin with a division into the number of the brothers
and sisters of theproposifus (if more than one leaving issue), and
then subdivisions; if only one such brother or sister, then with
division into the number of nephews and nieces, etc., and then
subdivisions;-would begin in short, with some far back gen-
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eration (every member of which had died before March 3, 1891), to
fix the number of stirpes. "Collateral C," on the other hand
would begin-as the starting point of the stirpes-with the
earliest generation of which one or more members is, or are,
now living, and then subdivisions.
It is evident that, starting under either of these schemes of
division, there might be either an allowance throughout of the prin-
ciple of representation, or there might be a refusal of it at some
arbitrarily selected generation.
In Maryland there have been six cases on the distribution of
spoliations awards, all-in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
Two of them, Corrie's Estate and Hollingsworth's Estate, do
not count, one might say, for in each case the ancestor had but
one child who left descendants, and so there was no chance for
any choice between theories B and C. In two other cases, Car-
rere's Estate and Tennant's Estate, which did present the usual
questions, theory B was adopted without any discussion, and
distribution was made accordingly. In Yellott's Estate and
Owings' Estate there were no descendants of the pro osits,
and in both these cases distribution was according to "Collat-
eral B," but they differed in this, that in the latter case (audi-
tor's account ratified in February, 1899), representation was dis-
allowed beyond grandnephews and grandnieces, while in the
former case (1892) it was (correctly, I submit) allowed indefi-
nitely (some grandchildren of grandnephews receiving so small
a fraction as one-six-hundred-and-seventy-second).
[Owings' Estate presented the curious fact that there had
been two Beal Owingses, both merchants in Baltimore, and both
alleged to be sufferers from spoliations. The descendants of
one asserted that their ancestor was the person whom the ad-
ministrator (to whom the award had been made) really repre-
sented, while the grandnephews, &c., of the other Beal Owings
insisted-and successfully-that he was the person whom the
administrator represented, and that the other lot of people
were rank outsiders. The award was not a large one, and after
an appreciable amount of it had been spent in litigation,
it is not very surprising that descendants of grandnephews
failed to make a fight over the question of representation
vel non.]
None of the cases went up to the. Maryland Court of Ap-
peals. An earlier case, however, Brooks v. Ahrens, 68 Md.
212 (i888)-which has been frequently cited-has, by an an-
alogy, thrown some light upon a side issue connected with the
subject.
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Here I may be allowed to mention parenthetically (what is
only a circumstance, not an authority) that as long ago as Feb-
ruary, 1893, there was a distribution made according to theory
C, in the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City, by an administra-
tor d. b. n. c. t. a. (George Brown's Estate). Because the ancestor
had been a stockholder in the Baltimore Insurance Company,
to which an award had been made, a small sum came to the
hands of the administrator, but the sum was so very small that
it was not worth while to make up a case in court and have a
decision about it, and the administrator took the responsibility,
not a very heavy one, of distributing according to his own view
of the law. Vivid recollection of the distribution of this an-
cestral windfall may be explained by the fact that my own
share of it reached the giddy total of $3.07. "The half-penny
be dem'd," said Mr. Mantalini, but, in the cause of accuracy, I
record the seven cents. Ther.e were in our Orphans' Court, a
number of other stockholders'-estates distributions, some accord-
ing to theory A, some according to B;-none, I believe, accord-
ing to theory C, except the distribution above mentioned.
From this personal and local digression returning to our
authorities, and first remarking that for the most part the decis-
ions in the appellate state courts on French spoilations are
none too clear in their statement of the questions, or of the
answers reached, we should now consider the difficulties of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blagge v. Balch.
One of the Massachusetts judges, as we have seen, thought "the
meaning of the language used" established theory B, while his
colleagues, holding otherwise, decided in favor of theory C.
Careful study will, I think, lead to the conclusion that the
Supreme Court's decision is merely against theory A, leaving any
other questions to be settled in each state as its own courts
may interpret its own statutes of distribution. If, to obtain
any further light than this, we turn to the cases cited, we find
that they furnish no clue, our study of them only results in
darkening counsel, for the Court cites within one page decis-
ions from Massachusetts (three), from New Hampshire (one),
Connecticut (two), New York (three) and North Carolina (two),
and the lawyer examining these cases will find that some of
them tend to sustain theory D, rejecting C; one to sustain C,
rejecting D; one to sustain B, rejecting C. Some of the cases
seem but slightly applicable. Of the three Massachusetts de-
cisions, two more nearly sustain either theory B or C than D,
and one sustains D rather than B or C.
Extremely puzzling is the concluding sentence (page 465):
"The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, Gardner v.
4
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Clarke, 2o D. C. 261; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
Clement's Estate, 16o Pa. 391, and the Circuit Court of Balti-
more County, Maryland, Leffingwell's Estate, 49 Phil. Leg. Int.
147, have expressed similar views to the foregoing."
Let us see. First noting that there was no Leffingwell Estate
case in Baltimore County, or in Maryland, and that this would
seem to be a mistake for the Leffingwell case in Connecticut (62
Conn. 347)-the earlier (i. e. New Haven Probate Court) decision
in that case being in fact reported in the Philadelphia Legal
Intelligencer at the page cited-and noting also that in that case
when it reached the Supreme Court of that State (decided
there in November, 1892), that court, affirming the decision
below, avowedly followed the "very clear and cogent" decision
in the Clement's Estate case (in 5~o Pa., which was afterward
overruled), saying: "We have followed the general outline and
to a considerable extent the language of that opinion, as ex-
pressing our own views" (62 Conn., at page 3 63)-the reader
is confronted with the difficulty that while the Pennsylvania
case, in i6o Pa., decides, as we have seen in favor of theory C,
the District of Columbia case is flat in favor of theory B,
and the Connecticut (Leffingwell) case pronounces with equal
emphasis for theory A! The Supreme Court's views expressed
by those three decisions, all thus approved in one breath,'one of
them being a case they were in the very act of reversing! Dor-
mitat Haomerus.
[It so happens that on the same page of the Philadelphia Legal
Intelligencer (page '47 of vol. 49) where the Leffingwell case is
reported, there is reported also the Maryland case of Carey v.
Morris (Hollingsworth's Estate). This decision rejected theory
A, but was inclusive (vide supra) as between B and C. It seems
quite possible that the Chief Justice meant to refer to Carey v.
Morris (Circuit Court of Baltimore City) when he wrote "Lef-
fingwell's Estate." If this conjectural emendation be correct,
it removes part of the difficulty.]
The tale of surprises is not quite all told. The very earliest
decision in favor of theory C was, as we have seen, in the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia (on November x4, 189T). Yet,
when Gardner v. Clarke was decided in the District of Colum-
bia on the last day of that month, the court said: "We are
glad to find that we are anticipated in this conclusion by the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia in a case to which our atten-
tion has been called" (citing Clement's Estate as just.reported
in 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 474), and then proceeded to decide in favor
of theory B! We should note, also, a mistake in the latest
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decision in Codman v. Brooks. The opinion says that "Gard-
ner v. Clarke, which is cited as an authority for a different
method of distribution [theory B], was decided under the stat-
utes of Rhode Island, where the distribution is fer stirpes with-
out regard to the degree of kinship, and it is therefore not mate-
rial to the question before us." That case was not decided
under the statutes of Rhode Island. It referred neither to
statutes nor decisions of that state. The decision (in favor of
theory B) was based upon general principles and upon one case
only (Clement's Estate, in the Orphans' Court), of which such
singular use was made. Justice Knowlton seems to have mis-
taken the last paragraph of counsel's argument for the opinion
which immediately follows it with very little of typographical
emphasis or break to distinguish them. (See page 263 of the
report in 2o D. C.).
The story of these spoliations cases, first and last, has been
a very strange one.
As the upshot of it all, what will probably be declared to be
(say in Maryland) the law? If the Supreme Court's decision
should be held to decide nothing except rejection of theory A,
theory C still has in its favor the emphatic and final Pennsyl-
vania decision in Clement's Estate and the latest Massachusetts
decision in Codman v. Brooks, and it has also in its favor (so I
think most lawyers would say) a greater inherent reasonable-
ness than has any other of the theoris so far mentioned.
But, even so, is that the last word on the subject? Is there
not perhaps some other scheme of distribution which may be
preferable even to theory C?
With some hesitation I venture to suggest that there is.
The question can be presented with so much more clearness
and brevity in the concrete (than in abstract terms), that it will
be well to come back to the award distributed to William Gray's
descendants-division into twenty-thirds, nineteen of which
went to living grandchildren and four to children of deceased
grandchildren. These grandchildren (living and deceased)
were (let us note here) as follows: Ten (all living) were the
children of William Gray's son Henry; five (all living) were the
children of son Horace; four (three living and one, Francis,
deceased), were children of son William, and four (one living
and three, William, Samuel and John, deceased) were children
of daughter Lucia G. Swett. (See table of descendants on page
500 of 167 Mass.)
And now, to make the discussion simpler, let us take figures,
and assuming at a mere venture (for I do not pretend to have
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any data on the subject) that (after settling with the attorneys
who obtained the favorable legislation and paying all the costs
of litigation and administration) there may have been $i5o,ooo
left to distribute, let us see how the money went. To begin
with, each of the nineteen living grandchildren got his or her
twenty-third, $6,521.74, the nineteen receiving, together, say
$123,913.o4. But how about the remaining four twenty-thirds
(aggregating $26,086.96) for the great-grandchildren? Who got
that, and in what proportions?
First, how many and who were these great-grandchildren?
They were twelve in number, five being children of Francis
Gray, five of Samuel Swett, one the daughter of William Swett,
and one the daughter of John Swett, and they goL the follow-
ing shares: The daughter of W. S. got $6,521.74 (one twenty-
third of the $i5o,ooo) and so did the daughter of J. S., and each
child of F. G. and of S. S. got $1,304.35, or one-fifth of one
twenty-third of the $i5o,ooo.
Now was that the correct distribution? Or ought each of
those twelve grand-grandchildren to have received one-twelfth
of $26,086.96 (= one sixty-ninth of $I5O,OOO), say $2,173.91 ?
Is there anything to be said in support of this last sugges-
tion ? I submit that there is.
The whole question turns on the principle that equality is
equity. This-like any good maxim-is well nigh (if not quite)
axiomatic, and is oftener silently recognized than formally
stated. Authority is hardly needed, but Co. Litt, 24 b; Doyley
v. Attorney-General, 4 Vin. Abr. 485, pl. i6; Farwell on Powers,
p. 476, and Richmond v. Irons 121 U. S. 27, 44, may be cited for
"the principle of equality in which equity delights."
Ninety years and more before the Act of March 3, i89i, cer-
tain American citizens suffered wrong through spoliations com-
mitted by French cruisers, and the righting of the wrong was
(for valuable consideration) assumed later by the United States
as part of and under the terms of its treaties with France. For
ninety years the United States neglected this duty, and then,
by way of tardy reparation long after the sufferers were
dead, did (on March 3, 189i) the nearest thing practicable to
the unperformed duty by awarding money to the "next of kin"
(descendants, if there were any) of the sufferers. These descend-
ants were, as we have seen, grandchildren (never nearer than
that, possibly all great-grandchildren, generally some grand-
children and some great-grandchildren). Taking the case
where all were grandchildren, they were entitled, because of
their equality in blood of their ancestor, to share equally. It is but
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one step to take (and a perfectly obvious one) to say that when,
out of twenty-three grandchildren either living or deceased
leaving children, nineteen are living and (because of the princi-
ple of equality) receive equally among them nineteen twenty-
thirds of the award, the remaining four twenty-thirds must
(because of the same pricible) be divided equally among the twelve
great-grandchildren.
But what then becomes, it may be asked, of the rule of divi-
sion per st'rpes? The answer is that it is overridden by the prin-
ciple of equality in the case of the great-grandchildren, just as it
was overridden by the same principle in the case of the grand-
children.
The children of Henry Gray (son of the propositus) may be
taken to have said: "We are ten, and because we are ten, we
must have (among us) ten nfneteenths (that is to say, each of us
one nineteenth) of the $123,913.04 which goes to the nineteen
living grandchildren, and this in spite of the fact that our
father was one of four children and would have been en-
titled (if the award had been made one generation earlier) to
only one-fourth of the whole $i5o,ooo." By the same token, the
five great-grandchildren, the children of Francis (deceased),
must be taken to have said: "We are five, and because we are
five, we -must have (among us) five twelfths (that is to say, each
of us one twelfth) of the $26,086.96 which goes to the great-
grandchildren (twelve in number), and this in spite of the fact
that our father was one of four grandchildren (deceased leaving
children) and would have been entitled (if the award had been
made in his lifetime) to only $6,521.74, his one-fourth of that sum
of $26,086.96 (or, which is the same thing, his one twenty-third
of the whole $15o,ooo). No per stirpes objection should stand in
our way any more than it stood in the way of the living grand-
children. We rely-as they have been relying-on the principle
of equality."
I submit that the analogy is perfect, and that such an argu-
ment, if it had been advanced in behalf of those great-grand-
children, could not easily have been answered.
The concrete instance above given is so much clearer than
any general statement of this scheme of distribution that it
seems hardly worth while to formulate the latter; but if it be
wanted, it would be something like the following:
Modified C: [When there are (a) living grandchildren and
(b) children of deceased grandchildren.] Division should be
first into two sums corresponding to two fractions; the numer-
ator of the first is the number of living grandchildren, the
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numerator of the second is the number of grandchildren
deceased leaving children, and the denominator of both is .(of
course) the sum of the two numerators; the first sum should
be divided equally among the living grandchildren, and the
second equally among the children of deceased grand-
children.
In this "case arising under a law of the United States,"
would it not have been within the constitutional power of the
Supreme Court to fix upon a definite scheme of ascertaining
the "next of kin" and of distribution among them ? If so, it
it would seem, I submit, to be matter for regret that the court
did not do so, insead of indicating that the fund should pass
to those persons (of the blood of the original sufferers) who
would be entitled under the statutes of distribution of each
State: Blagge v. Balch, page 462. These statutes differ some-
what in different states. The statement (on page 464) that
"in all the states real estate descends equally to the children of
the decedent, and to the issue of deceased children takingler
stires, and in most of them the personal estate is distributed in
the same manner," is not accurate. The state statutes (which
are summarized in i Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, §§ 301-3103) are
uniform as to descent (and "in most states the personal prop-
erty is distributed precisely as the real estate descends ") in the
case of children living, but differ in the case of children dead grand-
children living-the very case which arises in these spoliations
awards-among the states which so differ one from another
(descent and distribution) being Massachusetts and Connecticut,
from which two states came the cases then before the Supreme
Court! And again, when there are no descendants, but only collat-
erals of the propositus, the state statutes differ materially. (See
§§ 307, 3138 of Mr. Stimson's work.) And what are we to do
when, under statutes, or decisions, or both (as in Maryland
and other states) there is "no representation among collat-
erals after [or beyond] brothers' and sisters' children?" What
light, if any, does such exclusion throw upon the question how
to distribute when the very earliest in blood who are living are
"after" brothers' and sisters' children-are grandnephews, etc.?
In such state of things, which decision is correct-that in the
Yellott Estate or that in the Owings Estate (supra)? We must
remember always that in no state was a statute ever jpassed which
contemplated a distribution taking place sixty, seventy or ninety years after
a given death. 'It would seem more fitting that in the distribu-
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tion of these awards, the determination of the beneficaries and
their shares should not be left to possibly divergent decisions
upon varying statutes, but should be uniform throughout the
the country.
FREDERICK J. BROWN.
Errata should be noted in Blagge v. Balch (162 U. S,) as follows (beside
the mistake in assigning the Leffingwell case to the Baltimore County Court,
as above mentioned): On page 455, for "22 C. Cl., 721," read "22 C. Cl., I;"
on page 464, for "2 Jarman on Wills (5th ed.), *io8, *iog," read 2 Jarman on
Wills (5th Lond. ed.), *ioo8, *Ioog;" in Gardner v. Clark (2o D. C.), on page
263, for "45; Legal Intelligencer, 478," read "45 Phila. Leg. Int., 474;" in
Clement's Estate (i5o Pa.), on page 86, for "448 Leg. Int., 474," read "48
Phila. Leg. Int., 474."
Vide also Guy v. Baltimore, ioo U. S. 434 (reversing Baltimore City
Court), Hanley v. Donoghue. x6 U. S. i (reversing Court of Appeals of Mary-
land). Also
Article on Voidable and Void Judgments, i9 American Law Register (N.
S.) 673 (x88o). (See same subject continued in 32 Am. Law Reg. and Review,
213 (1893) and in Freeman on Judgments, 4th Ed., See. 557).
Brief note on Windfalls 2o Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 392 (1881).
